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In this paper we present and test a theory of how political corruption, found in many transition and emerging 
market economies, affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts 
that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political 
connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. We test this prediction on an 
almost complete population of Slovenian joint stock companies with 100 or more employees. Using the 
supervisory board structure, together with balance sheet and income statement data for 2000-2010, we show 





Why do firms prefer to be politically connected? Researchers have noted that firms try to achieve economic 
advantages over their competitors in a variety of ways, including a preferential treatment by state-owned 
banks in obtaining credit, easier access to government contracts, lighter taxation, and more relaxed 
regulatory environment (Faccio, 2006). Political connectedness has been noted in the seminal papers  of 
Tullock (1967), Stigler (1971) and Krueger (1974), and further documented in more recent studies of 
developed economies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001, and Krozsner and Stratmann, 1998, for USA) as 
well as developing and transition economies (e.g., Fisman, 2001, for Indonesia, Khwaja and Mian, 2005, 
for Pakistan, Kang, 2003, for China, Johnston and Mitton, 2003, for Malaysia, Dombrovsky, 2008, for 
Latvia, and Vynoslavaska et al., 2005, for Russia and Ukraine).  
The relationship between corruption and economic performance has been a focus of attention ever since 
Olson (1982) argued that special interest groups could cause stagnation and decline of nations. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) developed the argument that corruption is a destructive force in developing countries with 
weak institutions, and political connectedness of firms has been viewed as a fertile ground for political 
corruption, especially when there is evidence of “abuse of public office for private gains” (e.g., Kaufmann 
and Vicente, 2011). As a result, anti-corruption policies have become a central component of development 
strategies in many countries and the World Bank alone has supported more than 600 anti-corruption 
programs since 1996 (Banerjee et al, 2012).  
Research on corruption faces important theoretical and empirical challenges. On the theoretical side 
there is a need to go beyond the classical understanding of corruption as a generic form of moral hazard in 
organizations and analyze corruptive practices in different underlying environments (e.g., Banerjee et al., 
2012).1 On the empirical side the most important issue is one of measurement as corruption is illicit and 
secretive by nature. We contribute to both theory and empirical evidence in this area.   
In terms of theory, we build on Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) and present a model of corruption as 
a game between the elites (politicians) and the population, where the quality of democratic institutions plays 
an important part in punishing corrupt elites. Our model predicts that when corruption is not penalized 
because of poor political institutions, the level of corruption will increase. In our empirical work, we use 
unique panel data on firms to test the implication of this prediction, namely whether appointing politically 
connected individuals to the supervisory boards of directors of firms has a negative effect on the productive 
efficiency of these firms,   
Our paper relates to several studies documenting connections between firms and politicians. Faccio 
(2006) for instance finds corporate political connections to be relatively widespread, more evident among 
                                                     
1 The term “environment” refers to the nature of monitoring and punishments, as well as to economic decisions in 




larger firms and particularly common in countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt, imposing 
restrictions on foreign investment and having a less transparent system.2 She shows that corporate value 
increases significantly when a senior manager (CEO) enters politics and that there is no significant stock 
price effect detected when politicians are appointed to corporate boards. Faccio’s (2006) findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that politicians extract rents from companies they control (De Soto, 1989, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and that in equilibrium the cost of connections may offset their benefits. Desai 
and Olofsgard (2011) extend this notion by presenting a simple model in which politicians require firms to 
provide goods of political value for economic privileges (“elite exchange”). Based on the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 firms in 40 countries, they are able to show that “privileged” 
firms are rewarded with improved business environment (lower administrative and regulatory barriers, 
greater pricing power, and easier access to credit). But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits 
to politicians through higher employment, bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. These “privileged” 
firms are found to be worse performers than their non-influential counterparts. Finally, Kaufmann and 
Vicente (2011) develop a theoretical model where corruption is endogenized and population has a credible 
threat of insurrection. They test the model on a dataset of 104 countries, suggesting that a lack of internal 
incentives for the political elite is the force causing the emergence of corruption.  
While the existing studies contribute in important ways to our understanding of connections between 
firms and politicians, none provides detailed measures of “costs” of political connections in terms of lower 
productivity in a dynamic panel setting over a substantial period of time, using a large sample of firms. We 
are able to bridge this gap.  
We focus our analysis on the effect of politically connected supervisory board members on total factor 
productivity of firms that they supervise. In addition, we are able to examine the performance effects of the 
composition of the supervisory boards in terms of gender – governance issue that is of considerable interest 
from both an academic and policy standpoint. 
Slovenia is an interesting country-case in which to study the evolution of political corruption and its 
effect on firms’ productivity over time. The country went through a relatively successful transition from 
communism to a market economy in the 1990s and it entered the European Union in 2003 after adopting 
the European institutional framework and satisfying the Maastricht criteria for entering the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). However, Slovenia has also been characterized by widespread political 
                                                     
2 Faccio (2006) assembled a database of 20,202 publicly traded firms in 47 countries. She identified a firm to be 
politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (controlling more than 10 percent of voting shares) or one 
of its top officers (CEO, president or vice-president) was a member of parliament, minister, or a person closely related 
to a top politician or political party. Slightly less than 3 percent of firms in the total sample were identified as being 
politically connected. However, there is a high cross country variation. In Russia, for example, 86.75 percent of the 




corruption, underdeveloped democratic institutions and a continuation of high degree of state ownership in 
many firms. As such, it was unusually severely affected by the recent financial and economic crisis.  
At the start of privatization in the 1990s, ninety five percent of Slovenia’s GDP was produced by 
socially owned firms. Although one of the main goals of privatization was to find strategic owners who 
would bring know-how and new investment into the privatized firms, government eventually kept an 
important ownership stake through state investment funds.3 Moreover, firms in important sectors such as 
energy production and distribution, utilities, banking, and insurance remained state owned.4 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the appointment of supervisory board members in (semi-) state owned firms has 
often been based on political rather than professional criteria and international organizations have 
increasingly criticized Slovenia for maintaining an inefficient system of corporate governance in these 
firms. However, as Slovenia’s GDP growth averaged close to 5 percent in 2004-2008, the criticism was not 
taken seriously. The setting has thus lent itself to possible abuse of political power for private gain (political 
corruption).  
In order to study the effects of political corruption on firms’ performance, we have collected unique 
panel data on the supervisory board structure in 251 firms that represent an almost complete population of 
joint stock companies with more than 100 employees in Slovenia during the 2000-2010 period. In terms of 
capital, our sample represents 77 percent of the value of assets of all business entities in Slovenia in 2010. 
We have identified 3,668 individuals serving as members of the supervisory boards of these firms, with 24 
percent of them being politically connected in the 2000-2010 period. 
Combining individual characteristics of supervisory board members with the firms’ balance sheet and 
income statement data enables us to contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, we build 
on Bhattacharyya and Hodler’s (2010) theoretical model of corruption to generate a theoretical model that 
reflects the institutional setting of Slovenia. Second, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to test the 
effects of political corruption using detailed firm-level panel data. We find evidence of political corruption 
and show in Table A1 in the appendix that its trend is increasing rather than decreasing over time. Third, 
in terms of empirical methodology we control for pre-treatment conditions and generate results using the 
Blundell-Bond (2000) GMM panel data estimator. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical model, while in the 
third section we discuss the institutional setting and empirical specification. In the fourth section we 
                                                     
3 We describe the privatization process in more detail in chapter 3.  
4 The previous (Yugoslav) economic system of self-management was based on social ownership. The firms belonged 
to the society as a whole, but were managed by workers of self-managed enterprises on a principle one person one 




describe the dataset and data collection process. In the fifth section we present our empirical results and in 
the last section we draw our conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework of Political Corruption  
Kaufmann and Vicente (2011) define corruption in a broad sense as a collusive agreement between some 
agents in the economy who are able to swap political power over time in order to capture private gains. The 
most direct example is a situation where politicians have connections to firms and both exploit these 
connections for mutual benefit. The benefit might take the form of a special legislation or donation for a 
political campaign. Exchanging favors may also take the form of an explicit switch in the “position chair” 
among the elite players.  
A political economy model of corruption may also involve politicians interacting with a population 
that has the possibility of using political instruments to affect the welfare of the politicians. Kaufmann and 
Vicence (2011) for instance assume that the population can react to corruption by “insurrecting” – making 
the corrupt agents suffer a sufficiently high penalty.5  
Our theoretical model incorporates this reasoning and builds on the theoretical model of 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) in order to capture relevant dimensions of political corruption. While 
keeping the skeleton of Bhattacharyya and Hodler’s (2010) model intact, we depart from their model in two 
distinct ways. First, we assume that corruption decreases the private gains of production and therefore 
reduces private investment.6 Secondly, we allow for the response of the elite to be observable in a dynamic 
context. 
We assume that there are three groups of players in the economy: the incumbent political elite (E) 
with incumbent president in power, a challenger in the form of “new” elite (NE) and the rest of the 
population. The incumbent and new elite groups are homogenous groups and may be of either a good type 
(θG) with probability α or a bad type (θB) with probability 1-α. There are two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1 
the incumbent elite E chooses its level of corruption c1. Based on the level of c1 the population at the end 
of period 1 supports either the incumbent or the new elite. The level of corruption in period 2 depends on 
                                                     
5 In this context they treat legal corruption as arising when elite prefers to hide corruption from the population and the 
costs of hiding are so called investment in “legal barriers”. Investment in legal barriers and “insurrections” crucially 
depends on accountability and initially inequality among population. It can be proved that in the case of low initial 
inequality the legal corruption arises in the case of low accountability. In this case the legal barriers arise every period 
as well. On the other hand in the same case of low initial inequality but high accountability (for example like in 
Scandinavian countries) legal corruption and legal barriers do not arise and economy stays in this equilibrium. 
6 For the sake of simplicity, we also exclude the concept of corruptive income based on natural resources. The resource 
income largely depends on a country's resource abundance and our our model is designed for a country that is not rich 




the choice of elite that has been elected at the end of period 1. We assume that the good elite always selects 
a lower level of corruption than the bad elite:   
 
c(θB) > c (θG). 
 
The main source of income for all three groups of players is domestic production At that is primarily 
determined by the individuals’ labor-leisure choice and their decisions over tangible and intangible capital 
accumulation (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Corruption lowers the private return on productive 
activities and hence also the individuals’ level of investment. We assume that production At is a continuous 
function of corruption At = A(ct) with A׳(ct) < 0 and A׳׳ (ct) < 0.  
Following Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), we define the payoffs of the three players as follows. 
The welfare of the population in period t is  
 
Wt = W(ct) = (1 - ct)A(ct).                                                    (1) 
 
The payoff of the incumbent elite ut depends positively on corruption revenues π(ct) = ct*At and on people’s 
welfare W(ct):7  
 
ut = π(ct) + θW(ct) = (ct + θ(1-ct))A(ct) .                                                                                      (2) 
 
The challenging new elite is not in power in period t and thus has utility equal to zero. An important novelty 
of the Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) model is the introduction of democratic institutions. The quality of 
institutions is given by comparing probability p of electing good politicians in the next period with 
probability q of not being able to replace incumbent elite with new elite if people do not support the 
incumbents anymore. We assume that 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1. The quality of democratic institutions is given by D ≡ 
p - q. Low values of D signal poor democratic institutions as people’s vote has little impact on the 
probability that the new elite come to office. On the other hand, high D implies that the incumbents are 
likely to stay in the office only if the people want them to stay. 
In order to find equilibrium in this two-stage dynamic game with imperfect information, one applies 
the principle of backward induction. Assume that the elite in power in period 2 has no strategic incentives 
                                                     
7 As noted by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), there are different motives for why the incumbent elite also cares 
about people’s welfare and the performance of the economy. First, the economic conditions in general determine the 
salary of the incumbent elite and, second, the status and influence of the elite in the international community depends 




(e.g., to be elected in the following period) and it simply chooses the level of corruption that maximizes its 
utility, given its type θ: u2 = u(c2;θ). The good elite benefits more from being in office in the second period 
θW(ct) as θG > θB. In general, the elite in office chooses c* that maximizes (2): 
 
c*≡argmaxct ut(ct; θ) = -A/A׳ - θ/(1-θ).            (3) 
 
If the politicians in power are highly corrupt, θ is close to zero and the level of corruption depends on the 
ratio between production revenue and the marginal revenue from corruption. Corruption is always positive 
as A0>׳ by definition. In choosing the level corruption, the elite compares the value of production at a given 
level of corruption to the marginal revenue of increasing corruption by one unit. If politicians are good, 
with θ being close to unity, the second term dominates and is negative if θ ≤ 1. As corruption cannot be 
negative, we assume that the good elite always chooses c* = 0.  
If the bad politicians are in power, their chosen level of corruption in period two is higher, the less 
they benefit from social welfare (dc*/dθ < 0). In deciding whom to support at the end of period 1, the people 
are aware that their welfare will be higher with good rather than bad politicians in office. In particular, the 
people will prefer the elite with higher θ. They therefore support the incumbent elite only if they believe 
that it is good with a higher probability than the challenger, or µ(θE|c1) > α. In equilibrium, a bad incumbent 
doesn’t get people’s support if he plays c1 > 0. If he knows he will not get people’s support at the end of 
period 1, it is better for him to choose the level of corruption that maximizes u1(c1;θB). His expected utility 
in both periods is therefore equal to 
 
V(c*;θB) = (1 + q)u(c*;θB) ,          (4) 
 
while his utility from choosing c1=0 and getting people’s support is  
 
V(0;θB) = u(0;θB) + pu(c*;θB) .           (4’) 
 
Bad elite therefore chooses c1(θB) = c* if V(c*;θB) > V (0;θB), or  D < (u(c*;θB) - u(0;θB))/u(c*;θB)), as 
shown by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010). When D < (u(c*;θB) - u(0;θB))/u(c*;θB)) then the bad elite also 
chooses no corruption.  
An interesting case arises when we observe the elite’s decisions in a dynamic context in the 
environment of Slovenian-type underdeveloped democratic institutions, as described in the next section. 
Improving political institutions and increasing the probability of replacing the corrupt elite increases the 




other benefits of being in power. On the other hand, elites learn how the society treats the signal of 
corruption and they change their behavior accordingly, becoming either more or less corrupt. Increasing an 
elite’s willingness for corruption (lowering θ) the benefit of corruption increases, ceteris paribus: 
 
d((u(c*;θB) - u(0; θB))/u(c*; θB))/dθ < 0.         (5) 
 
Our model hence predicts that in the case when corruption is not penalized because of poor political 
institutions, we should expect the level of corruption to increase.  
Due to its illicit nature, we measure corruption indirectly – by estimating productive efficiency of firms 
with different potential extent of political corruption. In the next section, we first highlight the development 
of Slovenian economic environment and then present our econometric model.  
 
3. The Institutional Setting and Empirical Specification of the Model 
 
3.1. The Institutional and Policy Setting  
Slovenia is a post-communist country that entered the transition in the early 1990s. One of the most 
important tasks of economic policy was to carry out privatization. A major difference of opinion emerged 
between the so-called "left" (old) and "right" (emerging) elite about how to privatize social property. While 
the new elite advocated a revolutionary approach (first nationalizing completely the socially owned firms 
and then privatizing them through ten state-owned investment funds), the old elite was in favor of employee 
and managerial buy-outs.8 After lengthy discussions, a compromise was reached and the Parliament passed 
the Law on the Transformation of Social Property (1992) – an umbrella law for implementing other laws 
that followed. In this context, it is to be noted that Slovenia selected a transition strategy in which foreign 
capital didn’t play a substantial part.9   Privatization took place after 1995 when additional laws 
supplementing the core legislation were implemented. Most firms that were subject to the privatization 
law10 prepared their privatization plans between 1995 and 2000.  
                                                     
8 In fact there was also a third model of privatization proposed by Ribnikar and Prašnikar that favors the idea of 
converting  all assets of socially owned firms to preferential shares of retirement funds. New owners would invest 
funds into firms and gained the governance power. All three models are described in details in Prašnikar and Svejnar 
(1993). 
9 In 2002 Sandoz took over Lek, a pharmaceutical company that was one of the largest firms in Slovenia. Although 
this takeover worked well for the company, speculations that the existing management team reaped substantial rewards 
by trading on the basis of internal information have never been dispelled. A prevalent position taken by the politicians 
was not to privatize most successful Slovene companies to foreigners, if not necessary. 
10 The Law did not apply to enterprises providing special public services, banks and insurance companies, enterprises 
engaged in the organization of gambling, enterprises that were transformed under the Law on Cooperatives, enterprises 




The 1992 Privatization Law allocated 20 percent of a firm’s shares to insiders (workers), 20 percent 
to the Development Fund which auctioned the shares to investment funds, 10 percent to the National 
Pension Fund, and 10 percent to the Restitution Fund. In addition, in each enterprise the workers' council 
or board of directors (if one existed) was empowered to allocate the remaining 40 percent of company 
shares for sales to insiders (workers) or outsiders (through a public tender). Based on the decision about the 
allocation of this remaining 40 percent of shares, firms can be classified as being privatized to insiders (the 
internal method) or outsiders (the external method). In 2000 the first phase of privatization was almost 
completed, with majority of ownership in the small and medium sized firms being in the hands of state 
funds, investment funds and insiders (managers and workers). In large firms, state funds and investment 
funds gained control over the decision making process as these firms (a) were too big to privatize substantial 
part of their capital to insiders and (b) had many small dispersed owners.11   
The privatization process was relatively efficient in the small and medium sized firms. Many of 
them eventually bought the ownership stake of the other parties to the privatization process (the state and 
investment funds). Large firms, on the other hand, found themselves in a position where the state remained 
a powerful owner through the indirect ownership of the Funds. The politicians soon realized that a loophole 
in the privatization law enabled them to control the supervisory boards of these quasi-privatized large firms, 
thus allowing them to influence also the appointment of management boards.  
In 2001 a managerial buy-out of a quasi-privatized BTC company took place, using as financing 
the cash-flow of the firm. This opened the way for other management teams in big firms to act in a similar 
way. Following the BTC example, most takeovers were initiated and implemented by managers who were 
appointed by the political elite or had close ties to it. This constituted a second wave of privatization (2004-
2008) that resulted in a few successful cases, while some of the largest firms either ended up in bankruptcy 
with a high level of indebtedness or had their shares seized by the banks as the special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) established for the leveraged management buyouts were unable to repay their accumulated loans. 
In the meantime, in firms with prevailing state ownership the political elites continued to appoint politically 
selected supervisory board members who in turn elected politically selected members of the management 
board. In view of the underdeveloped governance institutions, the politicians were not “punished” for the 
mis-management of these quasi-privatized firms.  
After 2005 OECD started to warn Slovenia about inefficient management of firms with substantial 
state ownership. Because of this criticism and growing evidence about politically motivated appointment 
                                                     
11 As reported by study of Domadenik, Prasnikar and Svejnar (2008) that analyzed ownership structure in 157 big and 
medium sized Slovene firms slightly more than one-half of those firms were privatized primarily to insiders. The 
average share ownership was 31 percent by insiders, 34 percent by state and investment funds, 21 percent by other 




of supervisory board members, a new agency for capital investment management was formed to make 
appointment of board members transparent. However, anecdotal evidence and our firm-level information 
suggest that corporate governance in firms with state ownership remained the same. In 2011, under a new 
government, the agency was in fact liquidated.  
 
3.2 The empirical model 
We assume that the production function of an individual firm may be approximated by a Cobb-Douglas 




αL ,                                                                                                                       (6) 
 
where Yit represents output of firm i in period t, Kt and Lt are capital and labor inputs, respectively, and At 
is the Hicks-neutral efficiency level, or total factor productivity (TFP), of firm i in period t.  
While Yit, Kit and Lit are observable (usually in terms of value rather than in quantities), Ait is 
unobservable and is usually inferred as a residual.12 The acceleration of productivity growth in the US in 
the mid-1990s has generated the “new economy” view and a source-of-growth model started to stress the 
potential importance of intangible investments and their capitalization over time. In this context, our test of 
whether the composition of a firm’s supervisory board affects its TFP may be interpreted as a test of the 
effect of a corporate governance structure on the ability of firms to generate intangible investment.13 
In order to make the methods of measuring capital and labor more symmetric and capture the 
quality of the workforce, we use the wage bill as a measure of Lit. As argued for instance by Fox and Smeets 
(2011), the wage bill reflects the marginal product of labor better than does the number of employees.14  
Expressing equation (6) in logs yields 
 
yit = α0 + αKkit + αLlit+ ξit +uit ,                                                                                             (6a) 
 
where lower case letters correspond to the natural logarithms of variables in equation (6), while lnAit = α0 
+ ξit +uit. While α0 measures the mean efficiency level across all firms over time, ξit and uit capture producer-
specific deviations from the mean -- ξit refers to factors such as managerial ability and the composition of 
                                                     
12 This is Abramovitz's famous “measure of our ignorance.”  
13 Intangible resources in countries with underdeveloped capital and financial markets crucially depend on the ability 
of firms to generate internal funds. This is especially the case in Slovenia, as shown by Domadenik, Prašnikar and 
Svejnar (2008). 





the supervisory board that are observed by firm i and are likely to affect its choices of inputs, while uit is an 
i.i.d. component that captures factors that are unobserved by the firms and hence affect output but not the 
choice of inputs. It also represents a measurement error in output or errors due to functional form 
discrepancies. These deviations may be further separated into an observable (or at least predictable) and 
unobservable components. 
The identification and estimation of production functions using data on inputs and output is among 
the oldest empirical problems in economics with a key challenge of identification arising from endogeneity 
of inputs (the transmission bias discussed for instance by Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). Dynamic GMM 
panel data models (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991, and Blundell and Bond, 2000) are among the most 
popular approaches to tackle the problem of endogeneity by exploiting instruments based on lagged input 
decisions of the firm. We use the Blundell-Bond approach and specify our model (6a) as a dynamic 
augmented production function in which different supervisory board structures – contained in the ξit term 
in equation (6a) above -- may affect TFP. The key explanatory variable with which we augment equation 
(6a) is the share of the supervisory board members who are politically connected and who are the focus of 
our analysis. In addition, we include as explanatory variables the shares of board members who are female 
and foreigners, the share of board members who live in the region of the firm, the size of the firm, and the 
annual shifts in the average TFP. The shares of women and foreigners are included in order to test whether 
greater board diversity in terms of gender and international composition affects the firm’s efficiency.15 The 
share of board members who live in the region of the firm is included to assess the validity of the corporate 
social responsibility concept that local board members induce greater efficiency by bringing in a 
combination of a local sense of responsibility and local knowledge. Firm size is included to allow for 
productivity differences between small and large firms.  
The empirical model is specified as follows:  
 
yit = α0 + α1yit-1 + α2kit +α3kit-1 + α4lit+ α5lit-1 + α6’*SB_STRUCTUREit + α8*SIZEi + α8’*YEARt + uit ,     
                           (7) 
 
where SB_STRUCTURE is a vector representing the structure of the Supervisory Board (measured by the 
shares of the board members who are politically connected and females), SIZE is a dummy variable that 
takes on value of 1 when the firm has more than 250 workers (large firm) and zero when it has 100-250 
                                                     
15 If gender discrimination exists, firm performance would be better off in cases of a more balanced recruitment policy 
for managers and supervisory board members. Empirical evidence is mixed, ranging from positive effects of diversity 
management (Carter et al., 2003, Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004, and Smith et al., 2006) to no effect at all (Kochan et 




workers (medium sized firm). YEAR is a vector of dummy variables capturing annual time effects, α’s 
denote parameters, and uit is the error term. 
We apply Blundell-Bond (2000) GMM system estimation method to annual 2000-2010 firm-level data 
and we supplement the instruments that are generated directly by the system specification with several 
additional instruments. The first set of additional instruments is related to the privatization process in the 
1990s. Based on evidence from Prasnikar and Svejnar (2006) and Domadenik et al. (2008), we categorize 
the firms into four groups. The first two groups consist of “de-novo” firms being owned either by foreigners 
or domestic private owners, the third group refers to firms that were subject to privatization in the 1990s, 
and the fourth group is represented by firms that remained fully in state ownership (utilities, 
telecommunication and energy production and transmission). We anticipate that the initial ownership 
structure in the late 1990s is an important factor explaining input levels in the years that followed. The 
second set of instruments consists of the contemporaneous regional unemployment rate in the period of 
2000-2010, lagged (1998 and 1999) number of employees, and the change in return on equity in 1999.  
 
4. The sample  
 
4.1 The data collection process 
Our sample is drawn from the population of large and medium sized non-financial joint-stock companies 
and holdings that existed in Slovenia during the period 2000-2010. All the firms employed more than 100 
employees and had either one or two-tier corporate governance system.  
The data were obtained in three phases. First, we collected publicly available data about members 
of the supervisory boards from the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and 
Related Services (AJPES). This database ought to contain the first and last name, board position, home 
address, and country of residence of members of all supervisory boards. In particular, we were able to 
collect complete data on 308 out of 384 firms that existed in the group of non-financial joint-stock 
companies and holdings.16 The resulting database covers 3,668 supervisory board members.  
We complemented the official source of supervisory board members’ identification with reliable 
sources published on the internet to obtain data about the board members’ political affiliation and other 
                                                     
16 Companies were not required to report names of supervisory board members before 2007, however, and we were 
hence able to gather complete information about supervisory board members in 308 firms. 155 of them operated in 
the tradable sector and 153 in the non-tradable sector. It is important to note at this point that of 308 companies that 
had a supervisory board and were used in the analysis 292 had its own supervisory board. Remaining 16 companies 
did not have its own supervisory board but were owned and controlled by parent company with a supervisory board. 
Thus, for these 16 companies supervisory board data from parent company was used as a proxy that determined how 
important business decisions were made. We assumed that political influence from the parent company was also 




personal characteristics.17 We started by scanning online election registers to match the names and 
addresses of political election candidates with information in our supervisory board database. For the 
matched individuals we enlarged our dataset with information about their political affiliation and year of 
birth.  
In the third phase of data gathering we matched our database of supervisory board members with 
financial data from balance sheet and income statements for the 308 selected firms. After excluding firms 
with no balance sheets’ data available18 we ended up with 251 firms. Our final data set is an unbalanced set 
of 251 firms with 2,712 firm-year observations on all members of the supervisory board and balance sheet 
and income statement records. For these firms we also collected balance sheet and income statement data 
for the period of 1996-1999 in order to use these lagged values as instrumental variables in our empirical 
model. 
 
4.1 Description of variables used in the empirical model 
 
In 2010 the 251 sampled firms accounted for 77 percent of fixed assets of all firms in Slovenia and on 
average employed 528 employees. In the 2000-2010 period an average supervisory board had 5.31 
members, 18.9 percent of whom were women. Full 24.5 percent of supervisory board members in an 
average firm were politically affiliated.  
 
Table 1: Supervisory board composition by period 
 
 2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2010 2000-2010 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Number of 
supervisors 
5.673 2.150 5.247 2.081 4.803 2.023 5.319 2.118 
Share of politically 
affiliated members 
0.220 0.216 0.259 0.240 0.258 0.240 0.245 0.234 
Share of female 
members 
0.199 0.186 0.185 0.197 0.175 0.201 0.189 0.194 
 
                                                     
17 In particular, we have carefully checked if any supervisory board members had a political affiliation defined as 
being a candidate for a local and/or state-level elected position, member of a political party or continuously 
expressing public support for a given political party. 
18 From AJPES registry we were able to get balance sheet and income statement data for most of the companies except 
for companies facing compulsory settlement, companies in bankruptcy procedure and those companies that underwent 




Since the economy and the privatization process went through three important phases during 2000-
2010, we carry out our analysis for the entire period, as well as in the context of these three phases. The 
first phase (2000–2003) is the post-privatization period after the first privatization. During this phase, most 
firms completed the restructuring envisioned by the 1992 Law on Privatization. This is also a period of high 
investment and various other restructuring activities documented by Domadenik et al. (2008). The second 
phase is the period of economic upturn that lasted from 2004 to 2008 and contains the start of the second 
phase of privatization that relied primarily on management buyouts. The third phase (2009-2010) 
corresponds to the recent financial and economic crisis. The three periods also approximate the country’s 
political cycles, with a left-center coalition governing in the first period, a right-center coalition governing 
in the second period and a left-center coalition being in charge in the third period. 
As may be calculated from Table 1, during the three periods firms on average reduced the number 
of supervisors by 15.3 percent. On the other hand, the share of politically connected members recorded an 
increase while the share of female appointees decreased during the period under study. 
Based on ownership, we classify the firms in our sample as state owned firms, foreign owned firms, 
firms owned by a large domestic owner, management buy-out (MBO), internally owned firms, and firms 
with dispersed ownership (no single type of an owner having majority ownership). These ownership groups 
originate from the privatization process in Slovenia, as described in section 3.19 Approximately one-third 
of the sample (33.5 percent) consists of state owned firms, 11.2 percent is represented by foreign owned 
firms, 24.4 by internally owned and MBO firms, 13 percent by large domestic owners, and the rest (almost 
18 percent) by dispersed owners.  
Examining the prevalence of politically connected supervisory board members across types of firm 
ownership (Table 2), we find that state owned firms had the largest percentage of politically connected 
supervisory board members (ranging, on average, from 34.1 percent in the 2000-2003 period to 38.9 in the 
2004-2008 period and 35.3 in the 2009-2010 period), while firms owned by large domestic owners on 
average had only 16 percent of politically connected supervisory board members. Politically connected 
supervisory board members were more common in internally owned and MBO firms (around 23 percent 
and 20 percent in all three periods, respectively), which is understandable since the political elite in Slovenia 
was connected with top management of firms that went through privatization. Not surprisingly, foreign-
owned firms had the lowest percentage of politically connected supervisory board members (on average 




                                                     




Table 2: Share of politically affiliated supervisory board members by firm ownership 
 
 2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2010 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
State owned firms 0.341 0.239 0.389 0.238 0.353 0.248 
Foreign owned firms  0.131 0.212 0.082 0.180 0.075 0.138 
Firms owned by a large 
domestic owner  
0.152 0.210 0.172 0.228 0.160 0.189 
MBO 0.179 0.184 0.191 0.165 0.225 0.174 
Internal ownership 0.228 0.172 0.223 0.234 0.231 0.263 
Dispersed ownership 0.169 0.193 0.177 0.200 0.171 0.197 
 
Differences in supervisory board structures can be seen also across industries (Appendix Table A1). 
On one hand, there are industries with a low average number of supervisors and low share of politically 
affiliated supervisors (e.g. IT, trade and manufacturing). The electricity sector and utilities, on the other 
hand, have the largest number of supervisors and a high share of them being politically affiliated with an 
upward trend in utilities. This finding suggests that it is of interest to examine the extent of political 
affiliation of board members and its productivity effects separately for firms in the non-tradable and tradable 
sectors. Firms in the non-tradable sector tend to operate in a less competitive setting and thus have higher 
potential rents than firms in the tradable sector who tend to compete more in the export markets, a feature 
that could bring about more legal corruption into the non-tradable sector. 
Examining separately the data for companies in the tradable and non-tradable sectors (Table 3) 
shows that companies in the non-tradable sector indeed on average have a larger share of politically 
affiliated supervisory board members and also larger supervisory boards. Hence, our conjecture that 
political influence would be greater in the non-tradable sector where monopoly power tends to be greater 
is supported by the raw data. The board share of women is on average similar and declining over time in 
both sectors of firms. 
Table 3: Supervisory board composition by period and tradable and non-tradable sector  












5.912 5.446 5.528 4.969 5.123 4.479 5.806 5.077 
Share of politically 
affiliated members 
0.268 0.174 0.313 0.205 0.287 0.229 0.282 0.205 
Share of female 
members 





In our empirical analysis we use selected variables from the balance sheet and income statements: 
value added (VA) as a measure of output, labor cost (LC) as a measure of the labor input and tangible fixed 
assets (K) as a measure of capital. Value added is calculated as sales less the cost of goods, materials and 
services. All values are in 1996 prices. The average firm reported 21,744 € of value added per employee in 
the 2000-2010 period. The average value added per employee increased by 21 percent in 2004-2008 relative 
to 2000-2003 and fell slightly during the crisis period of 2009-2010. Labor costs per employee averaged 
20,952 € over the entire period and increased by 34 percent in 2004-2008 over 2000-2003. During the crisis 
years of 2009-2010, labor costs per employee followed an increasing pattern mostly due to an increase in 
the minimum wage by 25 percent in 2010. The number of employees increased by a mere 7 percent in the 
second period followed by a decrease of 3.6 percent in the third period.  
 
Table 4: Selected balance sheet and income statement variables for sampled firms by period 
 
 2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2010 2000-2010 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Employees 521.45 838.53 558.30 1059.6 537.82 1058.8 541.36 985.36 
Value added  (in mio 
€) 
8.92 16.3 11.00 21.70 10.90 23.30 10.20 20.30 
Labor costs (in mio 
€) 
5.35 9.35 6.36 11.90 6.29 11.80 5.98 11.00 
Value added per 
employee (in 1000€) 
19.23 28.19 23.25 38.60 22.89 36.23 21.74 34.79 
Labor costs per 
employee (in 1000€) 
16.65 6.50 22.42 9.74 25.79 10.46 20.95 9.50 
Fixed assets (in mio 
€) 
35.90 135.00 36.40 165.00 39.00 185.00 36.70 159.00 
 
In the next section we present the results of our empirical analysis. 
  
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 OLS and System GMM estimations 
 
In Table 5 we report the estimated parameters of the augmented dynamic production function (7), while in 
Table 6 we present the corresponding short run and long run elasticities. The (robust Huber) OLS and 
System GMM specifications yield relatively similar results, with the preferred GMM estimates being 




significant, suggesting that there is a high degree of persistence in value added over time. The short term 
elasticity of value added with respect to labor cost is high and similar to the elasticity obtained for the long 
run. The elasticity of value added with respect to fixed assets is relatively low in the short run, but 
substantially higher in the long term. Firm size isn’t found to have any effect on TFP. Note that we control 
for macroeconomic shocks by including year dummy variables. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of production function coefficients  
 
Coefficients OLS Blundell-Bond System GMM 
























Supervisory board characteristics 

























N 2430 2174 
Adjusted R2 0.952 - 
Hansen test (p-value) - 0.107 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.  






Turning to the effect of political connectedness of board members, in both the OLS and the Blundell-
Bond system GMM specifications there are strong negative effects of appointing politically affiliated 
members to the supervisory boards on total factor productivity of firms. While this TFP effect is not 
statistically significant in the short run, it is strong and negative in the long run. Using the GMM estimates 
in column 2, we find that increasing the share of politically affiliated appointees by 1 percentage point leads 
to a 0.139 percent average decrease in value added in the next year and to a 0.566 percent decrease in the 
long run, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that appointing a politically connected member to a 5-member 
supervisory board, and thus increasing political affiliation of board members by 20 percentage points, 
would decrease TFP by 2.78 percent on average in the next year and 11.32 percent in the long run. The 
negative long run effect of increasing the number of politically connected board members is also observed 
in the negative long run elasticity calculated from the GMM estimates in Table 6. 
Increasing the share of women on supervisory boards has a statistically insignificant instantaneous 
effect on TFP, while the lagged effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence test 
level in the GMM specification and at an 14.5 percent level in the OLS model. 
 
Table 6: Estimation of short and long term elasticities  
 
Coefficients OLS Blundell-Bond 
System GMM 
















S-R Elasticity w.r.t. share of politically affiliated 





L-R Elasticity w.r.t. share of politically affiliated 

















Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.  





5.2 Tradable v. non-tradable sectors 
As mentioned earlier, because firms in the non-tradable sector tend to operate in a less competitive setting 
and have higher potential rents and proportion of politically connected board members than firms in the 
tradable sector, it is worth examining whether legal corruption is stronger among firms in the non-tradable 
sector. In Table 7, we present the respective estimated coefficients for tradable and non-tradable firms, 
using the Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator. 
As may be seen from Table 7, the share of politically affiliated members of the supervisory board 
has a significant negative effect on productivity in the long run in the non-tradable sector, while the effect 
is statistically insignificant in the tradable sector. In particular, increasing the number of politically 
connected board members by one percentage point in the non-tradable sector on average decreases TFP by 
0.153 percent next year and 0.932 percent in the long run. This means that substituting a politically 
unconnected board member by a politically connected one on a five member board results in 3.1 percent 
lower TFP in the next year and 18.6 percent in the long run. Increasing the number of politically connected 
board members by one percentage point in the tradable sector on average decreases TFP by 0.137 percent 
next year but the effect diminishes in the long run. The results suggest that legal corruption is indeed 
stronger in the non-tradable sector. 
Appointing a female supervisor on a five member board in the tradable sector results in a 4.18  
percent lower productivity20 in the same year, but a positive and statistically significant effect of 4.54 
percent with a lag of one year.  Appointing female supervisory board members does not appear to have any 
significant effect in the non-tradable sector.  
 
Table 7: Estimated production function coefficients for tradable and non-tradable sectors (Blundell - Bond 
System GMM) 
Coefficients Tradable sector Non-tradable sector 
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N 1145 1028 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.427 0.753 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote statistically significant values at 1%, 5%, and 10% on a two tail test, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Estimates of short and long term elasticities in tradable and non-tradable sectors 
 
Coefficients Tradable sector Non-Tradable Sector 
















S-R Elasticity w.r.t. share of politically affiliated 





L-R Elasticity w.r.t. share of politically affiliated 

















Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.  






In this paper we present and test a theory of how political corruption affects corporate governance and 
performance of partially or fully state owned enterprises (SOEs). Our game theoretic model predicts that 
underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political 
connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. Using firm-level panel data on 
virtually all medium-size and large industrial firms in Slovenia, we measure a firm’s political connectedness 
by the share of politically connected individuals on its supervisory board. We show that a higher share of 
politically connected supervisory board members leads to lower total factor productivity of the firm, ceteris 
paribus. 
We also examine the extent of political affiliation of board members and its productivity effects 
separately for firms in the non-tradable and tradable sectors. Firms in the non-tradable sector tend to operate 
in a less competitive setting and thus have higher potential rents than firms in the tradable sector who tend 
to compete more in the export markets, a feature that could bring about more legal corruption into the non-
tradable sector. Examining separately basic data for companies in the tradable and non-tradable sectors 
indicates that companies in the non-tradable sector indeed on average have a larger share of politically 
affiliated supervisory board members and also larger supervisory boards. Within the multiple regression 
framework, we show that a higher share of politically affiliated members of the supervisory board has a 
significant negative effect on productivity in the long run in the non-tradable sector, while the effect is 
statistically insignificant in the tradable sector. The results suggest that legal corruption is indeed stronger 
in the non-tradable sector. 
Our estimates of the effect of women’s presence of women on supervisory boards suggest that the 
effect on productivity is positive. Given the paucity of women on supervisory boards, our findings are 
important for the debate about the appropriate gender composition of these boards. 
Our research provides important evidence about the effects of the prevalent form of political 
corruption that is found in many transition and emerging market economies. The political connectedness of 
firms that gives rise to this corruption will presumably be reduced as democratic institutions become 
stronger and able to punish corrupt behavior. Since this is a slow process, in the short term a superior 
solution may be carefully implemented privatization of the remaining SOEs. In young democracies with 
low political accountability and underdeveloped institutions, ongoing state ownership of many firms may 











Table A1: Supervisory board composition by period and industry  


























0.129 0.253 0.148 0.159 0.280 
 








Trade IT Transport Other 
Number of 
supervisors 









0.187 0.188 0.107 0.204 0.081 0.112 0.341 
 
 








Trade IT Transport Other 
Number of 
supervisors 









0.179 0.189 0.130 0.192 0.143 0.059 0.288 
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